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CEPAL REVIEW No. 26 
Crisis, adjustment 
and economic policy 
in Latin America 
David Ibarra9" 
T h e crisis in Latin America has a sui generis character, 
the elucidation of which has impelled the author to 
ven tu re into virtually unexp lo red fields of in-
terdisciplinary analysis and to make generalizations 
covering a variety of national situations. Within this 
framework, he asserts that many of the central prob-
lems which look like conjunctural distortions —short-
ages of foreign exchange, deficits in public finance— 
in reality stem from imperfect structural adjustments 
both in the international economy and within the Latin 
American countries, the treatment and cure of which 
will be much more than a short-term matter. 
To all this is added a set of circumstances which 
hinder the application of appropriate solutions, such 
as the decline in the industrialized centres' ability to 
provide development aid, and the undermining of the 
leadership capacity of governments by the doubts cast 
on the ideological and programmatic commitment to 
guarantee sustained growth, a target difficult to attain 
when economic self-determination has sunk to its low-
est in the recent history of the region. 
Should this diagnosis be correct, the remedies are 
not to be found in the prescription-book of economic 
stabilization policies, although this does not mean that 
it is superfluous. The task of making stagnation 
acceptable, or growth rates far below those recorded in 
the past, poses questions that go beyond the economic 
sphere. In this sense, the true answers are to be found 
in the political sphere, because only there could the 
foundations be laid for the social consensuses which 
would enable State and society to join in a national 
c o m m i t m e n t with t h e aim of r e g a i n i n g self-
determination and access to development. 
*Kormerly Director, ECLAC Mexico Office. 
Note: Preliminary versions of this paper were presented al 
the Expert Meeting on Crisis and Development in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile, 29 April to 3 May 1985) 
and at the tnu Twentyfifth Anniversary Meeting (Madrid, ¡26 
June 1985). 
Introduction 
It is by now a commonplace to assert that Latin 
America's economic crisis is the most profound, 
the most protracted and the most generalized 
since the Second World War. It is not so often 
said that after four years of declining per capita 
income and of sacrifices on the part of the bulk of 
the population, the intentions of the adjustment 
policy applied, with the natural lags and variants, 
by the great majority of governments are still far 
from being fulfilled. 
The per capita product decreased by over 
9% between 1980 and 1984 (ECLAC, several yearly 
issues). Its level today is similar to that attained 
seven or eight year ago. National income must 
have been still further compressed, to judge 
from the deterioration of the terms of trade 
(23%) and the increases in external debt servic-
ing. There are countries, and in particular social 
sectors within them, that may well have lost be-
tween one-fourth and one-third of their former 
income. 
One encouraging sign is that the balance-of-
payments current account deficits have plum-
meted down from over US$ 40 billion to US$ 3 
billion in the above-mentioned years. But per-
haps that is not so much a symptom of con-
valescence as an indication that adjustment has 
followed an essentially recessive course (ECLAC, 
1984). It should be noted that the trade balance 
climbed from a negative figure of TJS$ 1.6 billion 
to a positive one of US$ 37.6 billion. This 
remarkable result is not attributable to an in-
crease in sales abroad —which shrank by a little 
over 2% in the period— despite the fact that 
movements in internal relative prices were 
generally favourable to the products described in 
technical jargon as marketable or tradeable. The 
correction of the balance, then, was linked to a 
brusque recessive contraction in imports which 
reached figures of about 40%.' 
'The data cited probably give an over-pessimistic pic-
ture, inasmuch as the gestation periods in the development of 
new lines of production and new external markets are not 
explicitly taken into account. By way of illustration, it is worth 
while to point out that in 1984 the nominal value of Latin 
America's exports rose by almost 10%, as a result of the 
recovery of the United States economy in combination with 
the strategic effort made mainly by the larger Latin American 
countries with more flexible production capacities (Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela). 
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In the years referred to the external debt 
increased from US$ 275 to US$ 360 billion, not 
so much because further freely disposable re-
sources had been received but rather in con-
sequence of the capitalization of interest agreed 
upon de facto in the renegotiation processes (Igle-
sias, 1985). With a slight recent trend towards 
improvement, debt servicing was equivalent to 
35% of total exports of goods and services (1984) 
and also represented the principal item in gov-
ernment budget deficits. Indebtedness has be-
come a burden whose weight is helping not only 
to suppress the traditional contribution of ex-
ternal saving to capital formation in the develop-
ing countries —in Central America, for example 
it had come to represent between 40% and 
50%— but also to compel countries in crisis to 
become net exporters of capital or to set Draco-
nian limits to the investment and development 
promotion capacity of governments over periods 
that seem likely to stretch beyond the present 
decade. 
Despite the easing of world inflationary pres-
sures and the fairly widespread implementation 
of severe measures to restrict the expansion of 
domestic demand (curtailments of public ex-
penditure and of credit, increases in taxation and 
interest rates, incomplete adjustments to restore 
the purchasing power of wages, rationing of the 
foreign exchange supply), inflation, far from 
languishing, seems to be gaining new strength as 
time goes by. In the three-year period 1979-
It is undeniable that the last half-century has 
witnessed a gradual but certainly cumulative se-
ries of changes which are now substantially alter-
ing the operation of the world economy. The 
most manifest symptom of these changes is a 
tightening of the bonds of interdependence 
—dependence of countries upon one another, 
together with the corresponding loss of econom-
ic self-determination on the part of national 
units. The chain effects following upon the up-
heavals in the petroleum market or in interest 
1981, the weighted consumer price index kept to 
growth rates of not much more than 50% yearly, 
but thenceforward it went up by leaps and 
bounds, until it reached a rate of 175% in 1984 
(Iglesias, 1985). In practice, in many countries 
the spectacular internal stabilization efforts have 
proved vain; what is more, the all too common 
presence of marked distortions in relative prices 
seems to forebode new upward readjustments in 
the future. 
Crisis and adjustment policy together have 
weakened the public and private capital forma-
tion process —the investment coefficient de-
clined from 22% to 16% between 1981 and 
1983— detracting from the flexibility of the 
economies as regards the promotion of structural 
changes or the absorption of their inevitable 
costs. And this is a determining factor in the 
countries' capacity to perfect their internal 
economic autonomy, or to gain a better footing in 
the international economy. 
Hence it can be inferred that the Latin Amer-
ican crisis has its own peculiar connotations. It 
would therefore seem justifiable to make some 
attempt, even if only at the level of a first 
approximation, to identify its true causes. In par-
ticular, it is worth while to ask what are the char-
acteristics that distinguish the depression of to-
day from the cyclical fluctuations of the postwar 
period, giving it unwonted depth and nullifying 
the action of the time-honoured remedies. 
rates reveal the existence of intricate mechanisms 
of international transmission of distributive pres-
sures, as well as the impossibility of restoring for 
any length of time —except, perhaps, in the Uni-
ted States— national policies that run counter to 
the exigencies of the international cycle. 
The materialization of more and more tech-
nological advances and innovations of other 
kinds, superimposed upon the former de-
terminants of the composition of international 
trade, is rendering obsolete and incompletely 
I 
The direction of the changes 
in the international economy 
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and perhaps unfairly altering the international 
division of labour still in force between the Third 
World and the industrialized centres. To check 
the accuracy of this first proposition, suffice it to 
list some of the ongoing processes of change, 
without probing far into their deep significance: 
many branches of economic activity that made 
steady and world-wide progress in the last three-
quarters of a century are showing signs of de-
cadence, while there is a vigorous upsurge of new 
spearhead sectors, as they are called, which, 
albeit not yet consolidated, are benefiting by a 
demand in process of formation and unsatisfied 
(UNIDO, 1983 and 1984); for that very reason, 
market and investment preferences for lines of 
production with a high technological content are 
gaining a firm footing, while traditional capital-
intensive or labour-intensive projects are rele-
gated to a secondary plane; albeit offering de-
cisive advantages, the world-scale integration of 
the financial and merchandise markets means 
that, under pain of productive marginality, 
economic decisions formerly regarded as the 
special province of State regulations are placed 
outside the control of national governments; 
furthermore, rapid changes are beginning to 
take place in what used to constitute the energy 
basis of industrial organization, so that nowadays 
it can be confidently predicted that fossil fuel will 
shortly cease to be the sine qua non ingredient of 
modern production. The current energy pat-
tern, already partly exhausted, could not be 
transplanted or fully reproduced throughout the 
world, without causing ecological catastrophes or 
overstepping environmental bounds and limits 
set by physical resources (Fajnzylber, 1983). 
These readjustments will undoubtedly end 
by opening up a new development horizon, with 
beneficial results for both civilizers and civilized. 
Nevertheless, in the transition period through 
which we are passing, the gestation of these phe-
nomena exerts a disconcerting influence, creates 
uncertainty, enforces sacrifices and enormously 
complicates —as is the case in Latin America— 
the government of social policies and of econom-
ic policies. Let us look at some of the consequences 
which seem to be overthrowing the ordered 
world of postwar prosperity. 
In the first place, the stability of the com-
parative advantages that propped up the former 
international division of labour and the theories 
of international trade is being seriously un-
dermined. From one standpoint, for example, 
the competitiveness in manufactures painfully 
acquired by the developing countries through 
the use of highly labour-intensive techniques 
may well melt away in face of the proliferation of 
automated methods of production (robotiza-
tion). From another angle, electronic control of 
production might eliminate the predominance 
of economies of scale and lead to greater dif-
ferentiation of supply, with obvious benefits for 
the countries with small populations and mar-
kets. 
Be that as it may, what is at stake is the 
restructuring of the foundations on which the 
new international division of labour must be 
erected. But perhaps this new division, however 
closely its emergence is attended by the intention 
of assigning great benefits to the pioneers, can-
not be stabilized, or stabilize international 
economic relations, without a consensual 
formulation of agreements among all the coun-
tries involved. Nowadays, comparative advan-
tages depend less and less upon the initial endow-
ment of natural resources, or upon the plenti-
fulness of capital or labour, and much more 
upon a stable world climate with a propensity to 
concerted action, as well as upon each country's 
persevering efforts to attain excellence in 
specific areas of production (Feinberg, 1983). 
It should be noted that together with the 
unremitting pressures as regards the distribution 
of the benefits of international trade, a yet more 
basic question now arises: namely, the sharing-
out of exportable production among the dif-
ferent countries. The fundamental problem for 
the Latin American economies is that of defining 
which will be their stable sources of foreign ex-
change in the future, rather than striving to 
obtain better prices for the primary products 
which they already export, which, in a good 
many cases, are decreasingly in demand, and 
which are exposed to the risk of being displaced 
by substitutes or by rival products with more 
advanced technology.2 
'^Although a foothold has been gained in trade in man-
ufactures, mainly under the regional and subregional in-
tegration programmes, in many respects the attainment of a 
dynamic insertion in international trade is still lagging a long 
way behind. Of the 18 most important export products, only 
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Secondly, the process of industrial integra-
tion on a multinational scale—whose promoting 
agents are the older and younger generations of 
transnational corporations— is benefiting global 
productive efficiency and the employment of fac-
tors in situ. But it does not yet offer satisfactory 
answers with respect to the distribution of in-
come among the participant countries, or to for-
mulas for offsetting the loss of economic self-
determination, especially in periods of depres-
sion or when an unfavourable change takes place 
in the composition of certain countries' external 
demand (UNIDO, 1984). Here there is an in-
complete process of institutional and legal 
change, inasmuch as the defacto incorporation of 
countries into a fused production system has not 
been perfected by an international set of rules 
establishing a system of reciprocal guarantees 
among the participant States. 
The third effect of the uncompleted changes 
in the international economy has been to weaken, 
even if only for the time being, the industrialized 
centres' capacity to contribute to the develop-
ment of the peripheral areas, since they are find-
ing themselves compelled to devote the bulk of 
their energies to internal adjustments. The 
reduction of concessional aid to development, 
the obstacles to the replacement of capital and to 
the expansion of the lending power of the multi-
lateral financing institutions, the rise in interest 
rates itself, all bear eloquent witness to this di-
minished capacity (ECLAC, 1984, 1985 a and 1985 
b; Prebisch, 1981; Feinberg and Kallab, 1984; 
Haq, 1985). So does the fact that to the old-style 
protectionism with which the advanced countries 
covered, for example the non-competitiveness of 
their agricultural activities, is now added a new 
form of protectionism which arises out of the 
ageing of industries that are reluctant to give way 
before the redeployment of production on a uni-
versal scale. 
Nevertheless, the most striking manifesta-
tion of what is being stressed here consists in the 
fact that for the first time since the Industrial 
Revolution in England, the leading western econ-
omy has become a net importer of capital; in-
stead of exporting surplus financial resources, it 
five (meat, fish meal, wool, soya and petroleum) could reap 
the benefit of high income-elasticities; the remainder are 
already recording static or declining growth rates. 
has to draw upon international saving to defray 
internal expenditure, entirely reversing the tra-
ditional mechanics of balance-of-payments 
adjustments. 
Lastly, it must be realistically admitted that 
the adjustments and changes in process of gesta-
tion within and among the industrialized 
countries are determining a programme of work 
in the international sphere under which treat-
ment of the developing areas is relegated to a 
secondary place. Prior to reforming the old 
North-South modus vivendi, attention will un-
doubtedly first be devoted to the issues of trade, 
division of production, opening-up of financial 
and merchandise markets or financing of the 
reciprocal trade balances of the members of the 
First World (Bergsten and Krause, 1975; Norr, 
1975). It seems unlikely, therefore, that the ques-
tion of Latin American indebtedness will be thor-
oughly tackled while there is still disagreement as 
to the management of exchange régimes, of in-
terest rates, of control of capital movements or of 
formulas for symmetrically adjusting persistent 
disequilibria in the balance-of-payments position 
of the main industrial countries (Clein, 1982). 
Similarly, it may perhaps be idle to trust in a 
vigorous and sustained recovery of the world 
economic centres and even to rely upon their aid 
to development during the present decade. First 
they have to make sacrifices and concentrate re-
sources —as industrial restructuring in Europe 
shows— on adapting manpower and physical 
facilities to the accelerated modernization en-
forced by the international technology race and 
the consolidation of the new spearhead sectors. 
The generalized character of the crisis in 
Latin America suggests that its origin is mainly 
external, i.e., determined by the adjustments in 
the international economy. Similar effects are 
felt by countries markedly differing in size, de-
gree of industrialization, political and adminis-
trative organization and economic development 
strategies. 
In any event, for the reasons stated, solutions 
for the crisis cannot come from outside. Latin 
America must seek them in the organization of its 
own strength and enterprise, even in order to 
break through the inertia of the economic policy 
priorities of the industrialized centres. The way is 
not clear, there are countless obstacles; besides, 
the price of experimenting, failing and trying 
CRISIS, ADJUSTMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY/ David Ibarra 151 
again will have to be —is already being— paid. I n 
the new circumstances, economic growth will no 
longer be easily achieved; governments will have 
to mobilize the whole of society around a 
nationalist and democratic effort, so that the sac-
In the interval between the end of the Second 
World War and the mid-1970s Latin America 
made noteworthy progress in building new 
economic structures, bettering the average living 
conditions of the population, forming new social 
strata, and becoming industrialized and urban-
ized. During this period, the Latin American 
product was quintupled and industrial output 
sextupled, employment in the modern economic 
sectors increased fivefold, and a thriving middle 
class came into being. 
The convergence of rising external demand 
and the thrust of domestic import substitution 
paved the way both for an intensive economic 
modernization process and for acceptance of 
what we shall call here "development ideology". 
It was at once the cause and effect of prosperity 
that the legitimacy of the Latin American State, 
as well as its capacity for convocation and for 
political mobilization, gradually shifted away 
from the older Latin American reformist tradi-
tions and the ideals of economic justice and open 
participation in politics, and rested more and 
more firmly on the capacity of governments to 
foster and achieve economic growth {Pensamiento 
iberoamericano, 1984). 
This growth, with its power to increase the 
income of almost all social strata without the 
necessity of directly tackling the difficult ques-
tions of distribution, became a substitute for so-
cial reform, a harmonizing influence that miti-
gated political tensions and the integration factor 
par excellence of the Latin American societies. 
Thus, it passed almost unnoticed that the goal of 
economic growth had ceased to be an in-
strumental objective —the means of attaining 
higher ends— and had become the very back-
bone of action on the part of the Latin American 
States and the source of the legitimacy of their 
rifices of economic reconstruction can be made 
tolerable and are not the cause of unbridgeable 
social fissures. Accordingly, the time has now 
come to examine, even if briefly, the internal 
situation of the Latin American countries. 
governments. With this in view, the new ideology 
postulated that economic progress would be 
bound to generate, almost automatically, politi-
cal modernization and social justice. 
The new approaches were rapidly con-
solidated, because in many instances they de-
ferred open conflicts and made it possible to give 
almost everyone a little more, to maintain a con-
centration of income compatible with a respect-
able capital formation process, to open the way 
for the emergent economic groups and to render 
tolerable —in the expectation of better things— 
the widening gaps in levels of living and con-
sumption that separate us from the in-
dustrialized societies. It was not everywhere, how-
ever, that harmony reigned. The intensive 
economic growth that had taken place since the 
war subjected each country's body of institutions 
to severe pressures. In some cases, genuine mod-
ernization of political and social life has oc-
curred; in others it has not been possible to escape 
the formulas of authoritarianism; and in yet a third 
group, democratization and authoritarianism have 
alternated in shaky equilibrium, with no clear and 
definitive settlement of the question. 
Even so, the outstanding fact is the switch-
over from politics to economics. Growth, by vir-
tue of its efficacy in facilitating the reconciliation 
of interests and in concentrating the energies of 
society on a limited set of problems, assumed the 
leading role and eliminated from public discus-
sion what had traditionally constituted the very 
essence of political action. The instrumental 
advantages were many; it should be noted, by 
way of illustration, how the thorny problems of 
upward social mobility were solved in gradual 
and orderly fashion through the multiplication 
of jobs which accompanies economic expansion. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that gov-
II 
The Latin American sphere 
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ernments should have gone on from being pas-
sive arbiters in economic affaires to become by 
antonomasia promoters of economic develop-
ment and agents responsible for achieving it. 
And that is why the Latin American State has 
wholeheartedly joined in the world trends which 
determine a spectacular increase in the breadth 
of public functions and in the weight they carry 
in the economies. 
A first c o m p o n e n t of government ex-
penditure is aimed at correcting the effects of 
distributive inequalities, an intention prompted in 
the internal sphere by considerations of eq-
uity, if not by the political need to reduce potential 
sources of conflict, and in the external sphere by 
the revolution in expectations brought about by 
the Welfare State and the consumerism of the 
industrialized nations. 
A second item in public budgets that has 
been rapidly expanding through time is con-
stituted by outlays on the promotion of economic 
development, i.e., expenditure relating to pro-
grammes specifically designed to facilitate the 
development of private enterprise. 
In Latin America there is a Statist tradition 
whereby governments encourage or assume 
responsibility for specific activities in terms of 
general development interests. But State in-
terventionism does not figure' as a means of 
socializing economies, but as a formula for mak-
ing up their leeway in a shorter space of time or as 
a corrective of the defects of economic behaviour 
with a view to keeping it faithful to the service of 
individual interest, expressed through market 
laws. Even government-owned enterprises, 
rather than competing with or displacing those 
of a private character, support and complement 
them. These public bodies are usually providers 
of physical infrastructure (roads, ports, dams, 
airports), of basic services (energy, transport, 
financing, education) or of inputs in common use 
(minerals, steel, chemical products, fertilizers), 
which benefit the expansion of private businesses 
in all sorts of different ways. 
Setting aside the financing of the control 
machinery of the forces of law and order, the 
economic necessity of stimulating the private en-
trepreneurial sector, together with the political 
need to protect the weaker population groups, 
peremptorily called for expansion of the Latin 
American public sectors in the sphere of produc-
tion and of distribution (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979). To put it concisely, for several decades 
dynamic equilibrium was achieved on the basis of 
rapid growth of the product —sufficient to com-
bine substantial increases in productivity and net 
absorption of manpower from the subsistence 
sectors—, accompanied by a capital formation 
process which evolved slightly faster and by pub-
lic expendi ture which was also gaining im-
portance in the composition of aggregate de-
mand. The incorporation of manpower pre-
viously left marginal to the modern sector of the 
economy satisfied social demands and mitigated 
biases towards concentration in income distribu-
tion. On their side, the technical and professional 
middle classes met with similar responses in the 
multiplication of opportunities for moving up 
into better jobs, created by economic expansion 
itself. 
The model described, albeit functional at a 
given time in the past, could not be indefinitely 
prolonged without adjustments. Its limits were 
first encountered when the State apparatus be-
gan failing to meet, or only partly meeting, the 
proliferation of social demands —to some extent 
suggested by the achievements of advance 
societies— while, on the other hand, the increase 
in public expenditure became a burden and a 
factor of rigidigy in the market economy. 
To pick out only one element in the in-
tensification of social demands, reference may 
usefully be made to demographic pressures. The 
region's population growth rates are still among 
the highest in the world, despite having already 
entered upon their declining phase. The rate of 
expansion of the labour force, however, will re-
main at maximum figures —between 3% and 4% 
per annum— until the end of the present cen-
tury. This enormously restricts the real influence 
of economic policy as regards satisfying the 
aspirations of large segments of the population: 
the marginal sectors, the rising generations or 
the groups of women that are seeking to enter 
the labour market in the modern economic 
sectors. 
Hence the widespread propensity of the 
Latin American governments to incur deficits in 
their public accounts and to run into debt 
abroad. While demands became more numerous 
and more pressing, the readiness of enterprises 
and populations to pay heavier taxes or finance 
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public expenditure with genuine savings was de-
finitely lessening. Confronted with this paradox, 
governments continued to regard public ex-
penditure as still the key to growth and with it the 
stability of the whole social edifice. Accordingly, 
they resorted in varying proportions to deficit 
financing or to external borrowing, in the hope 
of gaining time for the completion of internal 
changes or of seeing favourable modifications 
take place ín the international sphere.3 With in-
sufficient or falling income the curtailment of 
public outlays might be necessary, but it ran 
counter to the postulates of development ideolo-
gy and, above all, eroded the governments' social 
bargaining capacity, at the very time when they 
needed it most (Stepan, 1979). 
Furthermore, in the economic sphere the 
foregoing constraints coincided in a good many 
countries with problems deriving from the ex-
hausted validity of national development pat-
terns, due either to the slackening of the dynamic 
impulse of import substitution, or to market size 
limitations, or to shortcomings in methods of 
integration in the international economy, or to 
the necessity of tackling other structural or orga-
nizational changes in production (Collier, 1973; 
O'Donnell, 1973). In any case, the renovation of 
national development patterns made consider-
able demands on government budgets in respect 
of providing the new physical and services in-
frastructure for private enterprise, socializing a 
significant proportion of the costs of investment 
in productive activities or of their restructuring, 
and subsidizing the branches where it was de-
sired that investors should concentrate future 
growth efforts. 
Nevertheless, the factor precipitating the cri-
sis was of external origin. The scarcity of foreign 
exchange markets which followed upon the 
second oil shock (1979), complicated by the fall in 
export demand and prices and the interruption 
of international credit flows precluded continu-
ity in the pursuit of the development objective, 
inasmuch as the capacity for manoeuvre of tradi-
tional economic policy was surpassed. 
3It should be noted, for example, that during the 1974-
1976 recession in the world economy the Latin American 
countries, still having room for manoeuvre, almost without 
exception carried on their growth strategies a l'outrance, 
following a clearly antkyclical policy. 
And here occurs a pernicious reversal of the 
questions of the cycle and of structural change. 
Looking after the immediate problem of the 
shortage of foreign exchange implies a previous 
transformation of the insertion of countries in 
the international economy. It is not a matter of 
simply exporting larger quantities than are sold 
already, since they would neither find a market 
nor bring in long-term profits, but of striving to 
place a new constellation of products as yet not 
even moderately clearly identified. 
Overwhelmed by the disequilibria in ex-
ternal payments, in public finance and in infla-
tion, governments have found themselves com-
pelled to renounce growth, to introduce severe 
adjustment programmes and to permit the 
accentuation of the existing disparities in income 
distribution. But in doing so, they not only place 
at risk the delicate dynamic equilibrium of the 
social forces, but break with the ideologically 
accepted view of the State's responsibility for 
raising the population's standards of living in 
consonance with democratic progress. This is 
why in Latin America the economic crisis may 
culminate in a political crisis, in a crisis of the 
legitimacy of States that find themselves inca-
pable of meeting the highest objectives to which 
they have committed themselves in what might 
be described as a basic social consensus. It is not 
that oubreaks of social violence are foreseen; 
rather, the risks are those associated with a stage 
of impoverishment and tension in relations be-
tween the State and the civil community, which 
make the reorganization of the Latin American 
societies an extremely difficult undertaking. 
It is often maintained that Latin America has 
been more profoundly affected by the in-
ternational depression than, for example, the de-
veloping Asiatic countries of the Pacific Basin, 
their heavier external debt being identified as the 
causal factor. The analysis is accurate. What is 
overlooked is the complex of socio-political cir-
cumstances in respect of which the two regions 
differ and which are determinants of everything 
from the behaviour pattern of the economies to 
the definition of viable policy options. 
In the American continent the western val-
ues of liberty, democracy and political pluralism 
have perhaps penetrated more deeply; whereas 
less intensive is the social cohesion born of a 
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national identity in which individualism is sub-
ordinated to the consciousness of belonging to a 
collective body with interests transcending those 
of its members. The former characteristic leads 
even authoritarian governments to choose com-
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